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AMORAL NUMBERS AND NARCOTICS 
SENTENCING 
Mark Osler* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We Americans are strangely drawn to numbers.  We pore over 
football rankings before any team has played a game.  We endlessly 
discuss “Ten Best” lists of songs or movies or television shows, ignoring 
the sheer subjectivity of that entire process.  In my own field, we treat the 
largely artificial law school rankings as if they came down from an 
objective (and judging) God. 
In each instance, the numerical orders we obsess over pretend to 
describe an existing hierarchy.  In truth, they are creating one.  A team 
becomes the “preseason favorite” and that shapes further outcomes.  A 
dress is listed as a “hot new look” on the cover of a magazine and 
therefore becomes one.  A law school rises in the rankings for reasons 
having nothing to do with quality and that undeserved image of quality 
becomes their identity, leading to the enrollment of more and better 
qualified students—at least for a year. 
This attraction to numerical systems, which create rather than 
describe reality, too often leads us to false priorities and bad decisions.  
Such is the case with the numerical matrices at the center of federal 
criminal law:  the arbitrary mandatory minimums and sentencing 
guidelines that rank-order the severity of crimes have time and again 
created broad and often tragic outcomes in our society.  This dysfunction 
is perhaps most clearly seen in the laws and guidelines governing 
narcotics.  These drug sentencing rankings too often are unrooted in 
anything of substance,1 yet have created a new and troubling reality—
the destruction of communities, the imprisonment of thousands of 
citizens, and the spending of billions of dollars, all of which create the 
baseless illusion that we are “doing something” about illegal narcotics.2 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas (MN). 
1 For example, the Supreme Court described the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine 
as resulting from a process that “did not take account of ‘empirical data and national 
experience.’”  See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (McConnell, J., 
concurring) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
2 See generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and Indiana’s Sentencing Reform 
Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867 (2013) (exploring the incarceration boom in Indiana and 
proposing a new model of criminal justice reform); Brian G. Gilmore & Reginald Dwayne 
Betts, Deconstructing Carmona:  The U.S. War on Drugs and Black Men as Non-Citizens, 47 
VAL. U. L. REV. 777 (detailing the ways in which the war on drugs has affected African-
American communities). 
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This Article seeks to describe the problem of these criminal law 
systems, which create rather than reflect reality, and to suggest a better 
way that will acknowledge our fascination with numbers yet turn us 
away at least from the worst outcomes of our current and wildly 
deceptive system of normative rankings, such as sentencing guidelines 
and mandatory minimum sentences. 
Part II broadly describes how our society is drawn to numerical 
systems that are often unmoored from an existing reality, yet often create 
one, and provides three examples.  Most strikingly to those of us in legal 
education, the rankings of law schools are one good example of this 
effect. 
Part III moves to specifics and establishes how it is that the 
numerical sets at the center of criminal law steer us wrong.  This 
examination centers on four types of numerical measures:  sentencing 
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, the weight of narcotics 
possessed as a mistaken proxy for culpability in drug trafficking, and the 
number of narcotics cases as well as the resulting sentences as a flawed 
indicia of success in drug interdiction. 
In turn, Part IV suggests a better way to use numbers in the field of 
narcotics interdiction, one that will move towards solving the problem of 
narcotics use rather than simply towards mass incarceration.3 
Numbers are not the enemy, but neither have they proven to be the 
solution.  As we re-examine the way in which we address narcotics, part 
of that evaluation should focus on the careless way we have let 
numerical systems become not just tools, but a shimmering hologram of 
principle itself, directing action even though there is no humanity 
within. 
II.  THE ALLURE OF NUMBERS 
Before looking at how mandatory minimums and sentencing 
guidelines in criminal law create rather than reflect a hierarchy of 
seriousness, it is appropriate to examine how this works in other areas.  
Criminal law, it turns out, is not alone in suffering from this 
phenomenon. 
I’m not the first to note the preponderance of meaningless rankings; 
as usual, the satirists got there first.  My current Senator, Al Franken, 
deftly made his point about the way a veneer of objectivity can attach to 
even the most subjective judgments once they are translated into a 
                                                 
3 For a thoughtful discussion on causes of mass incarceration, see Michael M. O’Hear, 
Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States:  Origins and Trends, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 709 
(2013). 
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ranking or list by publishing his own “World Religions in Order of 
Quality.”4  It is a joke, of course (it’s a comedy book, after all), but the 
religious quality rankings play out intriguingly: 
1. Judaism (Reform) 
2. Judaism (Conservative) 
3. Unitarianism 
4. Christianity (Mainstream Protestant) 
5. Christianity (Roman Catholic) 
6. Islam (Muhammad Ali/Ahmad Rashad type) 
7. Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, etc. 
8. Judaism (Orthodox) 
9. Christianity (Fundamentalist) 
10. Islam (Fundamentalist) 
Having looked over this list, I ask you to engage in a simple 
reflection.  Despite the obvious subjectivity, possible offensiveness, and 
even the silliness of this list, announced beforehand, didn’t you find 
yourself either agreeing or re-arranging the list mentally?  In other 
words, didn’t you, reading this simple, obvious hoax, engage with it 
(even if just for a moment) as if it was real?  That is the power of lists.  
There is something within us that longs for order, even if that order is 
baseless.  We can take random things, compile them in a list, and that 
ordering somehow becomes authentic. 
Nor can we avoid lists and ranking.  They are everywhere.  Fashion 
magazines are full of numbered lists of what is “in,” and those lists do 
more to create popularity than to reflect it.  This, unfortunately and 
dangerously, extends beyond fashion itself to the body types within 
those fashions.  In the realm of college football, dynasties are built in part 
on the strength of preseason rankings—supposedly descriptive lists 
which instead create future realities through their effects on recruits and 
program resources.  Finally, and closest to home, the U.S. News and 
World Report rankings of law schools does much more to create images 
of quality than it does to reflect the actual and distinct strengths of 
existing schools with enormous collateral damage to the operation of law 
schools in the United States. 
                                                 
4 AL FRANKEN, OH, THE THINGS I KNOW!:  A GUIDE TO SUCCESS, OR, FAILING THAT, 
HAPPINESS 50 (2002).  The book also includes a ranking of “places to hide once the shooting 
starts” and an exhaustive list of “things you love” indexed to “what it causes.”  Id. at 121, 
139.  The latter list contains the claim that watching The Bold and the Beautiful causes both 
obesity and diabetes.  Id. at 139. 
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A. Marketing and Magazines 
No one knows what appeals to us more than marketers (that is their 
business, after all), and they frequently use lists, completely baseless 
lists, to draw us in.  For example, the designers of InStyle Magazine, a 
magazine that is often prominently displayed near supermarket 
checkout counters, carefully include the promise of some kind of list on 
the front cover of every issue.5  Most issues contain more than one; for 
example, the May 2012 cover for InStyle offers up not only a picture of 
Cameron Diaz, but headlines for “12 Beauty Secrets Nobody Tells You,” 
“92 Cute Spring Outfit Ideas,” and “187 Style Finds Under $50.”6 
This profusion of lists isn’t accidental; there are no accidents on the 
“front door” of a carefully tended magazine.  Marketers know that 
numbers draw us in and lend a sheen of authenticity to nearly 
anything—even something as inherently subjective as an evaluation of 
“cute spring outfits.” 
When a fashion magazine sets out a list of “92 Cute Spring Outfits,” 
of course, it is also proactively defining, in the public eye, those 
particular spring outfits as being “cute.”  It is hard to imagine a more 
subjective measure than “cuteness.”  In fact, just about the only public 
measure of what kind of spring outfit is “cute” is just such a list.  The 
objectivity comes from the precise and somewhat odd number of cute 
spring outfits:  exactly ninety-two.  At first glance, this may seem utterly 
harmless. 
But only at first glance.  This normative function has a dark side.  
Those cute outfits too often look cute only on a certain kind of body, and 
therein lies the rub.  Fashion magazines have come under attack for their 
role in creating unrealistic body images in women, and especially in 
teenage girls.  In May 2012, one teenage girl, Julia Bluhm, staged a 
protest outside of the offices of Seventeen magazine, asserting that the 
magazine airbrushed photographs and that pictures in the magazine 
“did not represent real adolescent females, and contributed to 
unattainable ideals[,]” a charge that resonated with the public.7 
                                                 
5 See Google Image Search of InStyle Magazine, GOOGLE SEARCH, 
https://www.google.com/ (search “InStyle Magazine cover”; then follow “Images” 
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (revealing images of InStyle Magazine covers). 
6 For a detail of this cover, see Ella Gregory, Cameron Diaz Covers InStyle US Wearing 
Valentino, COCO’S TEA PARTY (Apr. 16, 2012), http://cocosteaparty.com/2012/04/cameron-
diaz-covers-instyle-us-wearing-valentino.html. 
7 Hollie McKay, Teen Takes on Seventeen, Says Magazine Contributes to Body Image Issues, 
FOXNEWS.COM (May 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2012/05/08/teen 
-takes-on-seventeen-says-magazine-contributes-to-body-image-issues/print#. 
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Numbers on a magazine cover, then, help to create a new reality, 
and it is that new reality which can be directive to society as a whole.  
The same is true in other areas as well. 
B. Football Rankings 
Every August, before a single college football game is played, a slew 
of preseason rankings are issued.  Most prominent among these are the 
listings compiled by the Associated Press and USA Today.8  The polls 
manage to include what turn out to be some spectacular flame-outs 
among teams ranked highly in the preseason,9 even when other parts of 
the poll are strikingly accurate.  For example, in 2012, the Associated Press 
poll accurately predicted the regular season finish of three preseason top 
ten teams:  Alabama at number two, Oregon at number five, and Georgia 
at number six.10  It also chose to promote, as the top team in the nation, a 
group which then went on to lose six games, including a loss in a third-
tier bowl played in El Paso.11 
Of course, all the teams ranked in the preseason poll, even the flame-
outs, were, in a sense, big winners.  That’s because rankings not only 
reflect the quality of a school’s team, they play a role in creating and 
maintaining the quality of the team.  Highly ranked teams play more 
often on television, which both generates more money and entices 
recruits.  Many newspapers commonly list and report only on games 
                                                 
8 The AP and USA Today rankings are used as part of the BCS rankings, which 
determine major bowl eligibility, though the BCS poll itself does not issue preseason 
rankings.  The 2012 preseason rankings are available at Randy Chambers, College Football 
Preseason Rankings 2012:  AP and USA Today Top 25 Preview, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 27, 
2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1312409-college-football-preseason-rankings-
2012-ap-and-usa-today-top-25-preview. 
9 See id. (listing the University of Southern California as number one in the Associated 
Press’s poll).  For example, in 2012, the preseason number one team, the University of 
Southern California, did not finish in the top twenty-five at the end of the regular season.  
2012 NCAA Football Rankings—Postseason, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/ 
rankings (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
10 Compare Chambers, supra note 8 (detailing the Associated Press rankings for the 2012 
preseason), with 2012 NCAA Football Rankings—AP Top 25 Week 15 (Dec. 2), ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/rankings/_/week/15 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) 
(detailing the Associated Press rankings for December 2, 2012, after the regular season had 
finished but before any bowl games). 
11 See John Erfort, Georgia Tech Beats Southern California in Sun Bowl, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Dec. 31, 2012, 11:51 PM), http://collegefootball.ap.org/article/georgia-tech-beats-
southern-california-sun-bowl-0 (explaining that the University of Southern California 
football team, ranked number one in the preseason, lost in the Sun Bowl to a Georgia Tech 
team that was only able to play in a bowl because of a special waiver from the NCAA, 
required because of Georgia Tech’s losing regular-season record). 
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involving local teams and those in the top twenty-five—meaning that 
you have to be in the top twenty-five to be reported on nationally. 
Importantly, all this is true not only of end-of-the-year rankings, but 
also of the preseason rankings, which are made without the benefit of 
any games having been played and involve teams with tremendous 
turnover in personnel from year to year.  Thus, even the seemingly 
meaningless preseason rankings create a new reality—they determine 
who goes into the season with confidence, who gets on television, who is 
covered nationally, and who is most attractive to recruits. 
To understand this effect, consider the biggest anomaly of the 2012 
season, the University of Southern California—the team that ended with 
that loss in El Paso.  They started the season ranked first in the nation but 
ended up with a (relatively) mediocre 7-5 regular-season record, which 
included losses to Arizona, Notre Dame, Oregon, Stanford, and UCLA.12  
Despite this seeming disaster, no one doubts that USC will be a powerful 
team next year and into the future.  One reason for this is that USC got 
verbal commitments from top national high school players early on in 
the 2012 season,13 while they were still riding the wave of what turned 
out to be an undeserved national ranking.  In other words, USC’s reality 
in future years will in part be created by the completely inaccurate and 
speculative preseason rankings in 2012.14  The ranking created a reality 
(good recruits and likely future success) even as it proved so dismal at 
reflecting the reality of USC’s strength. 
Just as a completely arbitrary list of “cute summer outfits” can play a 
role in body image problems, so these arbitrary football rankings create 
problems—albeit, not as serious as the health issues related to bulimia 
and anorexia.  Because the preseason rankings tend to list the same 
schools every year, they play a role in the continuation of a rigid 
hierarchy within the sport.  Even as a down year, for example, USC got a 
boost from the preseason rankings, and the highly-ranked recruits they 
scooped up early in the season will not be distributed to lesser teams, 
depriving them of upward mobility.  There are, after all, only a limited 
number of players in the United States who are both big and fast.  These 
lesser teams continue to spend outrageous amounts of money to play 
                                                 
12 See 2012 USC Trojan Football Schedule, FBSCHEDULES.COM, http://www.fbschedules. 
com/ncaa-12/pac-10/2012-usc-trojans-football-schedule.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) 
(providing the University of Southern California’s win-loss record for 2012). 
13 Rick McMahan, USC Football:  The Recruits Who Will Save Lane Kiffin’s Job Beyond 2013 
(Part 2), BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 11, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1439705-
usc-football-the-recruits-who-will-save-lane-kiffins-job-beyond-2013-part-2. 
14 In the same way, the teams that were accurately predicted to succeed in 2012 by the 
preseason poll (Alabama, Oregon, and Georgia, for example) will also be strengthened for 
the future. 
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big-time football, yet those schools are fighting a structure that 
constantly tilts against them regardless of merit. 
C. Law School Rankings 
In the spring of each year, U.S. News and World Report issues its 
annual ranking of law schools.  It creates this listing by blending a 
number of factors.15  Most important are two surveys of reputation.  A 
full quarter of the ranking is based on a “peer assessment” survey sent to 
some law professors, while another 15% flows from the results of a 
similar survey sent to lawyers and judges.16  The remainder of the score 
is accounted for by assessments of job placement rates nine months after 
graduation (14%), the LSAT scores of incoming students (12.5%), 
expenditures per student (11.25%), undergraduate GPA’s of incoming 
students (10%), job placement at graduation (4%), student-faculty ratio 
(3%), the acceptance rate of the school (2.5%), bar passage rate (2%), and 
library resources (.75%).17 
Virtually every aspect of this survey has come under attack as either 
unreliable or subject to manipulation by law schools.18  The “peer 
review” portions, for example, which make up a large percentage of the 
ranking criteria, are remarkably “sticky”—that is, they seem to stay the 
same from year to year regardless of what is actually happening at a 
given school.19  Moreover, the peer review by practicing lawyers and 
judges suffers from a terribly low response rate:  meaning that in an 
average year fewer than 200 lawyers and judges have determined this 
important part of the rankings.20  Shockingly, this means there are about 
the same number of law schools in the United States as there are voters 
                                                 
15 See Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS 
(Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings (explaining the 
methodology used by U.S. News to rank law schools). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 One of the more persuasive critiques has come from Washington University Professor 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, whose book, Failing Law Schools, contains a myriad of acute 
observations relating to the U.S. News rankings.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW 
SCHOOLS (2012). 
19 This tendency extends even back before the advent of the U.S. News Rankings.  Brian 
Leiter of the University of Chicago has catalogued the static nature of reputational rankings 
back to 1977 on his blog.  Brian Leiter & Dan Filler, The More Things Change, the More They 
Stay the Same . . . Again, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/03/the-more-things-change-the-more-
thay-stay-the-sameagain.html. 
20 TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 79–80.  U.S. News has been forced to begin averaging 
over two years in this category.  Id.  
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in a sector of the rankings that provides a full 15% of the final tally.21  
The other categories are also flawed, largely in that they invite “gaming” 
by the schools to increase their rank.  Law schools, for example, have 
included any kind of employment and even hired their own graduates to 
inflate “employment” figures,22 and have adjusted their policies on 
transfers to maintain revenue without jeopardizing the LSAT numbers 
that count for the U.S. News rankings.23  That is nothing, though, 
compared to the outright lying about numbers engaged in over a period 
of years by the law schools at Villanova and the University of Illinois.24 
The pressure to do well has twisted the priorities of law schools in 
some gruesome ways.  Instead of using financial aid to help needy 
students, grants are strategically employed by many schools to harvest 
an incoming class with relatively high LSAT numbers and grades.25  The 
result at schools which do not have huge endowments is that the 
students most likely to get high-paying employment are subsidized by 
the law school debt accumulated by their lower-scoring classmates.26  
That is, if scholarships are funded by tuition money, it is the less-
qualified students who subsidize those with better credentials.  The 
shocking meta-story here, combining the relative meaninglessness of the 
rankings’ inputs and the importance of the results, is that the ranking 
does far more to create outcomes than it does to reflect or report them. 
For example, Professor Tamanaha points to the experience of Emory 
Law School, which dropped eight places from the 2011 rankings to those 
released in 2012.27  This drop did not correlate to any significant change 
at that school, but it represented a tremendous driver of outcomes.  The 
dean resigned.28  Perhaps more importantly, it put Emory in the position 
of having to put far more resources into luring the very best students in 
terms of LSAT scores (rather than the neediest ones) just to maintain the 
hope of returning to its former status, because the eight-point drop was 
sure to produce a drop in applications and the qualifications of 
                                                 
21 Id.  The U.S. News rankings released in 2012 listed 200 schools, and this did not 
include those schools that are not accredited.  Best Law Schools, U.S.NEWS, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-
rankings/page+8 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
22 TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 71–72. 
23 Id. at 88–94. 
24 Villanova and Illinois falsified data on the qualifications of incoming students.  Id. at 
74–76.  See also Richard W. Painter, Numerical Half Truths, Human Lies, and Other Distortions 
of Truth, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 479 (2013) (contending that the scandals at the University of 
Illinois and Villanova were, at least in part, a result of “our obsession with the numbers”). 
25 TAMANAHA, supra note 18, at 96–99. 
26 Id. at 98. 
27 Id. at 80. 
28 Id. 
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applicants.29  In turn, this furthers the unfortunate focus on LSAT scores, 
rather than the life stories, financial need, or actual abilities of applicants. 
As with fashion magazines and football rankings, law school 
rankings create a new reality, which then takes on a life of its own, built 
on smoke and mirrors. 
III.  NORMATIVE RANKINGS AND LISTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 
In the fields described above, we saw how lists and rankings create 
interest, direct outcomes, and give meaning to things even when there is 
little or no empirical basis for the formulation of those lists themselves.  
The same is true in criminal law. 
The three examples given above (fashion magazines, college football, 
and law schools) all involve lists that relate in some way to marketing of 
a product or service.  Fashion magazines are selling not only the 
magazines, but the styles promoted by advertisers.  College football is 
selling tickets and seeks television revenue, all of which are benefits from 
increased exposure.  For law schools, U.S. News rankings are often used 
in marketing materials, and the rankings themselves sustain a formerly 
robust news organization, which has largely been reduced to a ranking 
service.   
But what about criminal law?  Certainly, rankings such as those 
found in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not driven by the same 
kind of consumerist marketing, since there is nothing being bought and 
sold (at least not directly).  However, there is a common impulse at 
work.  Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums are both the 
creation of elected officials, people who are often anxious to be seen as 
doing something about a particular type of crime.  Just as a marketer who 
needs to sell a dress would be well advised to have it be listed in InStyle 
Magazine as a “cute summer look,” or a dean looking to increase the 
status of his law school might try to game U.S. News ranking numbers, 
so a politician who wants to seem thoughtful and forceful about crime 
might look to create that image through the seeming objectivity of 
numerical matrices.  “Five years for five grams of crack” may not really 
be that different than “92 Cute Spring Outfits.” 
Here, we will examine four types of lists or ranking devices within 
criminal narcotics law at the federal level:  sentencing guidelines, 
mandatory minimum sentences, the use of weight as a proxy for 
culpability, and the use of the number of people incarcerated or drugs 
seized as a measure of success.  Taken together, these numbers-based 
systems have a tremendous influence on the operation of criminal law.  
                                                 
29 Id. 
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Indeed, as caseloads grow, it is easy to understand how numerical 
systems would seem like a good idea, as they tend both to promise 
uniformity in sentencing from case to case and greater efficiency. 
I focus here on federal systems not because they are most important, 
but because they are capable of being described within the scope of this 
Article.  State experiences vary widely, and others have already done an 
excellent job of cataloguing this diversity.  Moreover, the federal 
experience has defined anti-drug efforts in the national media, in part 
because narcotics captured the attention of Congress.  As Frank Zimring 
put it, “The lead role in declaring a war on drugs was played by 
Congress, which has throughout the period after 1914 played a much 
larger role in penal policy regarding drugs than any other forms of 
crime.”30  If we are looking for a national view of sentencing trends and 
effects, there really is only one national system of sentencing. 
A. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
1. Hierarchy Within the Guidelines 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were implemented in 1987.31  For 
nearly two decades they were mandatory, but in 2005 the Supreme Court 
ruled in United States v. Booker that to preserve the constitutionality of the 
guideline system they would be “advisory” to sentencing judges.32  
Despite this advisory status, the Sentencing Guidelines continue to have 
great weight in federal sentencing.  The structure of the sentencing 
process still largely centers on a narrow sentencing range produced by 
these guidelines, and there are still substantial disincentives to varying 
from the guideline range.33 
One of the more fascinating features of these guidelines is the formal 
ranking it necessarily creates, putting in order the perceived relative 
severity of various crimes.  The Guidelines are based around a grid that 
lists sentencing ranges according to two inputs:  the seriousness of the 
offense, which defines a numerical “offense level,” and the defendant’s 
                                                 
30 Franklin E. Zimring, Sanctions: Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 331–332 (2005).  Zimring notes that more than a quarter of 
the people imprisoned nationally for drug crimes were federal prisoners, compared to 
about four percent of those imprisoned for “common violent and property crimes.”  Id. at 
332 (footnote omitted). 
31 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012). 
32 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
33 See Mark Osler, Seeking Justice Below the Guidelines:  Sentencing as an Expression of 
Natural Law, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 172–73 (2010) (discussing several disincentives to 
varying from the Sentencing Guidelines).  These disincentives include a desire to avoid 
reversal, the public tracking of sentences, and the risk of inviting greater restrictions.  Id. 
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prior criminal history.34  Offense levels are calculated starting from a 
“base level,” to which are added various points for aggravating factors 
(or, more rarely, points are subtracted for mitigating factors).  For 
example, the base offense level for a simple kidnapping is thirty-two 
points.35  To that base level, six points are added if a ransom demand is 
made,36 four points are added if the victim suffers permanent injury,37 
and six more points are added if the victim is sexually exploited,38 
among other factors. 
In contrast, insider trading is a less serious crime under the Federal 
Guidelines with a base offense level of eight,39 with enhancements 
available based on the amount of money the defendant gained from the 
scheme.40  The widely varying offense levels between these two crimes 
produce very different sentences under the Guidelines.  For example, if 
we look at the simplest form of each (that is, without enhancements), as 
committed by someone with no criminal history, the result is that the 
trader would be subjected to an advisory guideline range of zero to sixty 
months, while the kidnapper would face a sentence of 121–151 months.41 
At a very basic level, then, the Sentencing Guidelines create a 
hierarchy, which is revealed through relative offense level scores.  At the 
top of that hierarchy will be the most serious crimes and at the bottom 
will be the least serious crimes, because we naturally want to give the 
harshest punishments to those who commit the most serious crimes.  The 
Guidelines themselves refer to this ordering of seriousness as 
“proportionality.”42  To order crimes into a hierarchy of seriousness and 
then call that ordering “proportionality” certainly gives the result an air 
of scientific precision.  This impression is reinforced by the sheer heft of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (now expanded to three thick 
volumes) and the impressive progression of punishment set out in the 
sentencing grid.43  However, that air is nothing more than a vapor, 
especially when we look at the Guidelines’s sense of proportionality as 
applied to narcotics sentences. 
The story behind the creation of this “proportional” hierarchy was 
revealed by one of its framers, now-Justice Stephen Breyer of the U.S. 
                                                 
34 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.5, pt. A, tbl. 
35 Id. § 2A4.1(a). 
36 Id. § 2A4.1(b)(1). 
37 Id. § 2A4.1(b)(2)(A). 
38 Id. § 2A4.1(b)(5). 
39 Id. § 2B1.4(a). 
40 Id. § 2B1.4(b)(1). 
41 Id. at ch.5, pt. A, tbl. 
42 Id. at ch. A, pt. A, at 3. 
43 Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, tbl. 
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Supreme Court, who was a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
from 1985 to 1989 while serving as a judge on the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  Writing in the Hofstra Law Review about the process the 
Commission used to draft the first set of guidelines, Justice Breyer laid 
bare a completely unscientific and in fact quite messy process.44  It 
appears that almost immediately there was conflict on the Commission 
as “different Commissioners [had] different views about the correct rank 
order of the seriousness of different crimes. . . . [T]he members of the 
group inherently tend[ed] to ‘trade’ over particular items so that each 
person [found] his own views reflected only some, but not all, of the 
time.”45  From Breyer’s report, it seems that the commissioners were 
reluctant to “abandon their own subjective values” and also expressly 
rejected the systemic use of a more objective ordering mechanism, such 
as public polling or an assessment of the possibility of deterrence.46 
Deadlocked on this issue, Breyer reveals that “the Commission 
reached an important compromise”:  rather than trying to objectively 
order the ranking of offense levels, they simply used data from previous 
sentencings to mold the new guidelines from past practice, and then 
adjusted them where they saw fit.47  There was simply no objective 
principle at work in the end. 
2. Narcotics Within an Unprincipled Guideline Hierarchy 
As described above, the Commission that framed up the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines did not use any meaningful sorting principle to 
establish the hierarchy of seriousness that defines the offense-conduct 
input to those Guidelines, other than an amalgamation of past 
practices.48  This, in turn, left a blank slate (in a moral sense) for later 
commissions and Congress, which had the power to alter that hierarchy 
but were left without consistent or even articulable guidance on the basis 
                                                 
44 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises 
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the primary compromises the 
Commission made in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines). 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 Id. at 16. 
47 Id. at 17–18. 
48 In critiquing this process, I do not mean to denigrate any use of sentencing systems 
that rely on collecting broad sentencing data, then making that available to judges or 
others, provided that this process is used consistently as time goes on, rather than as the 
baseline for a system which will then steadily increase that baseline independent of 
systemic input from sentencing judges.  In fact, I have advocated for real-time sentencing 
information systems to be used in place of sentencing guidelines such as that in use in 
federal courts.  Such real-time systems would likely have the effect of moderating harsh 
sentences.  Mark Osler, The Promise of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the 
Conflict Between Uniformity and Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 203 (2013). 
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for that structure or its amendment.  Flooding into that vacuum, reactive 
politics filled the void.  Not surprisingly, Congress proceeded to create 
harsh drug sentences both in statutes49 and the Guidelines50 in a 
frighteningly herky-jerky style, largely reacting to public reports about 
new drug “epidemics.”  The result was a guideline book that boasted a 
stringent, yet baseless, sense of proportionality where narcotics sentences 
regularly exceeded the terms of nearly every other type of crime. 
The bizarre outcome of this process is easily observed.  In the 
Guidelines of today, for example, the base offense level for distributing 
300 grams (about ten ounces) of crack cocaine or 500 grams of 
methamphetamine is thirty-two,51 the same offense level we saw for 
kidnapping.  While this amount is far more than anyone would need for 
personal use, it is hardly remarkable; large narcotics rings in a large city 
might go through several times this amount in a single day.  Yet, the 
ranking afforded this offense, as reflected in the offense level of thirty-
two,52 is greater than that given for the forcible rape of an adult (thirty),53 
killing a person in a voluntary manslaughter (twenty-nine),54 disclosing 
top secret national defense information to the North Koreans (twenty-
nine),55 arson creating a substantial risk of death (twenty-four), and 
extortion (eighteen).56 
As I have set out elsewhere,57 one fascinating aspect of this 
dysfunctional ranking system is that it often punishes more harshly the 
narcotics crime that indirectly victimizes people (through increased 
violence, for example) than it does those direct victimizations.  In other 
words, one reason to punish drug activity is because it leads to things 
                                                 
49 Primarily through mandatory minimums, such as those included in 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
50 Congress at times has directed changes to the Sentencing Guidelines themselves and 
in 1995 vetoed a proposed change that would have lessened sentences for crack cocaine.  
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/19970429_RtC_Cocaine_ 
Sentencing_Policy.PDF. 
51 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2012). 
52 Justice Breyer’s Hofstra article implies that the Sentencing Commission in the end 
decided not to create rankings relating to the severity of crimes.  See Breyer, supra note 44.  
However, that ignores reality; regardless of how the Commission thought of its work, the 
bare fact that plays out in courtrooms daily is that the offense levels assigned to various 
crimes are constructed as a numerical matrix.  It is this ordinal ranking that plays a large 
role in determining the sentences that people actually serve. 
53 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1(a)(2). 
54 Id. § 2A1.3(a). 
55 Id. § 2M3.3. 
56 Id. § 2B3.2(a). 
57 Mark Osler, Indirect Harms and Proportionality:  The Upside-Down World of Federal 
Sentencing, 74 MISS. L. J. 1 (2004). 
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like random violence (manslaughter) and rape, yet we punish narcotics 
trafficking more harshly than we do the actual commission of 
manslaughter and rape under the hierarchy established by the 
Guidelines.  The drug trafficker described above has an offense level of 
thirty-two—two more than the rapist, and three more than the person 
who commits manslaughter.  Drug dealing, it seems, is not only seen to 
be an indirect cause of rape and killing, but somehow worse than 
actually raping and killing (at least in some circumstances). 
3. How Guidelines Create Reality 
The reality surrounding someone who sells 300 grams of crack is not 
very remarkable.  A low-level street dealer who sells ten grams every 
day hits that standard in a single month after all.  There is nothing about 
that particular street-level dealer that distinguishes him from thousands 
of others or makes him any more dangerous than other drug dealers.  In 
fact, it is hard to imagine anyone beyond the most casual and temporary 
distributer not meeting this threshold if all relevant conduct is 
considered.58  Yet, the Guidelines create a remarkable status for him—
serious offender worthy of very harsh punishment relative to others—
that is unrelated to any objective standard.  This status simply does not 
correlate to facts on the ground, given the probability that this particular 
crack dealer is necessarily buying powder cocaine from someone else, 
who is buying it from a network of others, who likely bought it from an 
importer.  Viewed holistically, the only thing that would define this 
bottom-feeder as a serious offender relative to those others is the artifice 
of the Sentencing Guidelines and the related numerical systems, such as 
mandatory minimums. 
In other words, this unsubstantiated status of serious offender 
doesn’t exist until it is created by the Guidelines. 
However, once that status is created by the Guidelines, it has very 
real consequences.  The defendant is much more likely to get a long 
sentence, and that sentence is less likely to be overturned on appeal.  We 
taxpayers get to fund the housing of this defendant for that lengthy term.  
One consequence we won’t see is this:  any difference in actual drug 
trafficking.  Because street-level trafficking has such low barriers to 
entry, the position will quickly be filled and nothing will change other 
than a slight bump in American incarceration. 
                                                 
58 See Richard Levitt, The Impact of Uncharged Conduct in Sentencing, N.Y. L.J. (ONLINE) 
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=12025707451 
64&thepage=1.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, of course, uncharged relevant conduct is 
considered at sentencing. 
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B. Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
Statutory minimum sentences are closely intertwined with the 
Sentencing Guidelines in the federal system; for example, a mandatory 
minimum will establish the effective floor for a guideline where both 
apply except in certain defined circumstances.59  However, these 
minimums are distinct from the Guidelines in at least two important 
ways.  First, they comprise a less comprehensive ranking system than the 
Guidelines because they cover far fewer crimes.  Second, they are even 
more directive than the Guidelines because they are mandatory in most 
cases. 
Like the Guidelines, the statutory minimums set out in the federal 
code hit hard at even minor narcotics offenders.  The most-often used 
mandatory minimum sentences are contained in 21 U.S.C. § 841, which 
provides for stiff sentences for distributing a variety of narcotics.  There 
are two primary groups subjected to mandatory minimums under 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b), which Congress referred to as “serious” traffickers and 
“major” traffickers.60  For example, possessing with the intent to 
distribute 280 grams of crack cocaine makes one a “major” trafficker and 
earns you a minimum sentence of ten years (in the absence of prior 
narcotics convictions—if you have one of those, the minimum doubles to 
twenty years),61 while just five grams of methamphetamine gets a five 
year minimum sentence (or ten years with a prior conviction) as a 
“serious” trafficker.62 
One odd feature of the mandatory minimums that perhaps pops out 
more clearly in the statute than in the Guidelines is the often arbitrary 
way in which drugs are valued in relation to one another.  For example, 
a five-year minimum applies to both ten grams of PCP63 and five grams 
of methamphetamine,64 despite the fact that both drugs have the same 
amount per dose, five micrograms.65  Why is it that methamphetamine is 
                                                 
59 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2.  See generally Lynn Adelman, The 
Adverse Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing on Wisconsin’s Efforts to Deal with Low-Level Drug 
Offenders, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 689, 689 (2013) (“I have long been convinced that the federal 
sentencing laws and guidelines result in an enormous amount of over-punishment, 
particularly in drug cases.”). 
60 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative 
_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_
Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
61 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
62 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). 
63 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) (PCP). 
64 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (Methamphetamine). 
65 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 9 (2012). 
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taken twice as seriously as the very dangerous PCP?66  And why are both 
of them ranked so far ahead of heroin, for which it takes a whopping 100 
grams to meet the five-year threshold of this same provision?67 
There really is no good answer.  The ranking of methamphetamine 
being more serious per dose than PCP, which in turn is more serious 
than heroin, is abjectly arbitrary.  Yet, the numbers, drawn from vapor, 
create a hierarchy that has real effects and drives the engine of over-
incarceration. 
One aspect of mandatory minimums that extends beyond the effects 
of the guideline matrix is the way that not only narcotics but the 
possession of firearms in relation to narcotics trafficking is subjected to 
harsh sentences, even when the firearm isn’t used, or even shown.68  One 
of the sharpest denunciations of these minimums came in an award-
winning opinion by Judge Paul Cassell of Utah.69  In that case, United 
States v. Angelos,70 a first-time narcotics offender ran into a welter of 
mandatory guidelines after being convicted of two small-time ($350) 
marijuana sales and the possession of three guns (which were not used 
or brandished in the course of the crimes).71  Because of these statutory 
minimums, Judge Cassell was compelled to impose a fifty-five-year 
sentence. 
In his opinion, Judge Cassell not only expressed his disagreement 
with the arbitrariness of the statutory minimums (calling them “unjust, 
disproportionate to his offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal 
violence—but nonetheless constitutional”),72 he called for a presidential 
commutation of the sentence he was giving.73  Moreover, Judge Cassell 
did something remarkable, unusual, and illuminating:  he critiqued the 
mandatory minimums by bringing to the surface the false ranking of 
seriousness that they contain.  Specifically, Judge Cassell included in the 
                                                 
66 PCP is so dangerous that, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, clinical 
trials on humans could not be completed because of negative effects on the subjects.  See 
PCP/Phencyclidine, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (last updated Dec. 2012), 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/pcpphencyclidine. 
67 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (providing the primary narcotic/gun mandatory 
minimum sentence provisions). 
69 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004); see also Green Bag 
Announces “Exemplary Legal Writing 2005” Honorees, GEO. MASON UNIV. SCH. LAW, 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/news/GB_Almanac (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) 
(discussing how the Green Bag, a quarterly journal dedicated to good writing about the law, 
awarded Judge Cassell’s opinion in United States v. Angelos its award for outstanding legal 
writing). 
70 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. 
71 Id. at 1230. 
72 Id. at 1261. 
73 Id. at 1262–63. 
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opinion itself two tables which compared the sentence required in the 
relatively minor Angelos case to the treatment of other crimes under the 
guidelines and mandatory minimums, noting that the defendant’s 
marijuana trafficking received a much higher mandated sentence than 
crimes such as causing death as part of narcotics trafficking, hijacking an 
aircraft multiple times, and raping ten-year-old children.74 
A sitting judge is at the very point where the unprincipled numbers 
meet the realities of a human life, and Judge Cassell’s opinion is 
compelling in large part because it exposes the raw and human effects of 
that interaction. 
C. The Use of Weight as a Ranking of Culpability 
Built into the mandatory minimums and Sentencing Guidelines 
described above is an equally unsupportable and much older ranking 
system—the assignment of sentences based on the weight of the 
narcotics a defendant may possess with the intent to sell.  For example, a 
federal defendant who holds just twenty grams of cocaine and is 
sentenced pursuant to the relevant guideline range faces an offense level 
of twelve,75 while one who is caught with sixty kilograms is rated at an 
offense level thirty-six.76  This translates, for defendants with no criminal 
history or other relevant factors, into a guideline sentence of ten to 
sixteen months for the former offender and 188–235 months for the 
latter.77  This enormous gap exists because of the completely unfounded 
assumption that the person who possesses the most narcotics is 
necessarily the most culpable.  This idea is undone by the simple reality 
of mules:  people who ferry large amounts of drugs from one place to 
another for relatively low pay.  They possess a lot of narcotics but are not 
very culpable in the grand scheme of things.  Moreover, incarcerating 
mules, like incarcerating street dealers, will make almost no difference in 
drug trafficking, because they are easily replaced by other low-wage 
laborers. 
By ranking the culpability of narcotics felons primarily based on the 
weight of the narcotics they possess or possessed, we are using a very 
crude measure of culpability and creating incentives to go after people 
who really don’t matter much.  The Sentencing Commission’s own data 
reveals that this incentivization is exactly what is happening, with the 
result that federal resources are too often being used primarily to pursue 
people who are street dealers, mid-level managers, or mules.  For 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1247. 
75 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(14) (2012). 
76 Id § 2D1.1(c)(2). 
77 Id. at ch. 5, pt. A., tbl. 
Osler: Amoral Numbers and Narcotics Sentencing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
772 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
example, the Commission’s report to Congress on crack cocaine crimes 
in 2007 revealed that 66.9% of crack defendants in federal court were 
prosecuted for these lower-level actions, which combine low culpability 
(by any realistic measure) with weight amounts significant enough to 
trigger higher sentences.78  Like the Guidelines and mandatory 
minimums generally, the use of weight as a proxy for culpability within 
those systems does not reflect a reality; rather, it creates one that serves 
no real social purpose. 
D. Numbers of Convictions/Seizure of Narcotics 
Press releases in federal drug cases consistently trumpet three things:  
the amount of narcotics seized, the number of people arrested or 
convicted, and the lengths of the sentences they received.79 
Big numbers in any of these areas—big piles of marijuana, twenty-
seven defendant indictments, 360-month sentences—impress us.  We are 
accustomed to thinking in terms of numbers (as already established) and 
these kinds of numbers often appeal to us visually, as well.  We respond 
to the image of a stack of marijuana bales or cocaine bricks,80 for 
example, with a certain sense of satisfaction; it means that something is 
being done about the drug problem. 
Of course, this is often patently untrue.  We assume that the measure 
of success is amount of marijuana seized, or people arrested, or length of 
sentence, but if what we care about is actually solving the drug problem, 
none of those numbers are particularly useful because the drugs and the 
people are often easily replaced.  As it turns out, the sense of success 
these big numbers convey is an illusion.  Seizing stacks of marijuana and 
cocaine, bringing in lots of arrests, and getting long sentences haven’t 
resulted in success against the problem of narcotics trafficking and use.  
The federal government’s own analysis shows that the use of narcotics in 
this country remains at high levels, virtually unchanged from previous 
                                                 
78 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 19 fig. 2-4 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/20
0705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
79 See News Releases, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pr/ 
news.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (providing several years of DEA press releases).  In 
addition, U.S. Attorney’s offices often issue press releases at the time of indictment, 
conviction, or sentencing. 
80 See Pot King Gets 27 Years in $6M Bust:  McChesney Faced a Minimum of 10 Years in 
Prison, WANE.COM (Mar. 4, 2011, 3:47 PM), http://www.wane.com/dpp/news/matthew-
mcchesney-sentencing-marijuana-pot (providing images of drugs that were confiscated 
during a bust in Fort Wayne, Indiana). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 3 [2013], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss3/3
2013] Amoral Numbers and Narcotics Sentencing 773 
years.81  The drug war, thus far, has been won by drugs, and the kind of 
enforcement we have pursued may actually increase violence rather than 
reduce it.82 
We have assumed that if we seize a lot of drugs or imprison a group 
of people that those drugs or people won’t be immediately replaced, but 
too often there is no grounding in reality for those assumptions.  Once 
again, numbers, even in the absence of substance, create a reality:  the 
impression that something worthwhile is being accomplished, which 
serves to garner continuing support for the institutions and people that 
create this illusion.83 
IV.  AN ARGUMENT FOR BETTER NUMBERS 
A. A Better Number with Which to Evaluate Interdiction:  Price 
As the examples in Part II above show, informally compiled lists and 
rankings perform three functions.  They mask subjectivity with a veneer 
of credibility.  They draw interest.  Perhaps most important, they create a 
new reality and a set of outcomes that flow from that reality rather than 
what actually pre-existed the list or ranking.  We see all of these things at 
work in American criminal law within the federal system.  In the end, we 
are left with an odd combination:  numbers that seemingly announce a 
remarkable string of successes and a tough approach on crime, and little 
to no change in the actual problem being addressed. 
This Article is not meant as a general screed against the use of 
numerical evaluation—just the use of numerical systems that are made 
up without a firm basis in reality.  After all, without numerical 
                                                 
81 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
MONITORING THE FUTURE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ondcp/Blog/2011_monitoring_the_future.pdf. 
82 See generally Dan Werb et al., Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug Market Violence:  A 
Systematic Review, 22 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 87 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ihra.net/files/ 
2011/03/25/ICSDP_Violence_and_Enforcement_Report_March_2011.pdf (providing a 
systematic review of the impact of drug law enforcement on drug market violence). 
83 The focus on numbers in federal sentencing, and in particular the way the sentencing 
process centers on calculating a guideline range from a number of numerical inputs, also 
serves to greatly reduce the role allowed to a traditional tool of the oppressed:  narrative.  
While defendants are generally afforded a chance to speak at sentencing, this story-telling 
moment is often secondary or tertiary and mooted by the number-driven process.  The 
relating of individualized circumstances is controlled and directed by the numerical matrix 
of the Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the historical sorting mechanism for story-telling, 
which is the passage of time.  By reducing individualized circumstances to particularized 
numerical inputs, federal sentencing takes leave of a rich and worthwhile ancient tradition 
in sentencing, which allows the full story of the defendant, told holistically and 
chronologically, to play a central role in the broad consideration of an appropriate 
punishment. 
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evaluations, such as stock prices, our economy would grind to a halt.  
What is wrong with the rankings described here is that they don’t 
correlate to real markets, and it could be that the solution lies with a 
better use of economics and market analysis. 
After all, the nonsense numbers described in Part II (“92 Cute Spring 
Outfits”) would hardly withstand an economic analysis, because the 
inputs are so purely subjective or are unrelated to any current reality or 
guiding principle for which there might be a societal consensus.  Instead, 
the numbers create the illusion of a societal consensus in order to create 
an effect.  We are seduced by them, and seduction has little to do with 
rational thinking and logic. 
So what might an economic evaluation tell us about narcotics?  At a 
very basic level, an economic analysis would focus on markets, and the 
measure of a market is price.  Absent sudden changes in demand for a 
product, if you increase the supply of that product, the price will go 
down.  If you decrease the supply, the price will go up.  Given that, the 
true measure of success in drug interdiction (which aims to diminish 
supply) isn’t how many people you lock up, it is the price of that product 
in a market. 
Thus, the real evaluation tool for gauging our narcotics interdiction 
efforts is street price.  If that is true (and I think it is), the news isn’t good.  
The price of cocaine and heroin actually went down during the height of 
the “war on drugs.”84  Thus, the reality created by the primary normative 
number systems described here—sentencing guidelines and mandatory 
minimums—was not one that negatively impacted narcotics trafficking 
by the best economic measure, price. 
B. Using a Number that Works 
As set out above, numbers of people incarcerated and pounds of 
drugs seized are a lousy gauge of success in drug interdiction, and 
mandatory minimums and tough sentencing guidelines don’t do much 
to increase the price of drugs.  If that is the case, what should be done to 
eradicate drugs? 
                                                 
84 See generally Abdala Mansour, et al., Gangs and Crime Deterrence, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
315, 319 (2006); Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Illicit Drugs and the Americas:  Avoiding a Pax 
Mafiosa, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, Summer 2007, at 58 (2007), available at 
dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00064.00008; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
RETHINKING U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS:  A HEMISPHERIC PARTNERSHIP FOR A 
TURBULENT WORLD 25–26 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin
_america_partnership. 
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Just as economics and a focus on markets offer us a better method of 
evaluation, it offers us a better means of interdiction, as well.  The 
narcotics trade, after all, is a business, and businesses are governed by 
the rules of economics. 
To start with, consider an accessible and worthwhile chapter from 
perhaps the most popular economic book of the last few decades:  2005’s 
Freakonomics, by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, devoted a 
fascinating chapter to an analysis of the crack trade, titled, “Why Do 
Drug Dealers Still Live with Their Moms?”85  There, based on 
information from the inside of a drug-selling gang in Chicago, they 
determined that street-level crack dealers in Chicago were making only 
about $3.30 an hour.86  However, it was (like many other jobs in that 
gang) a role that nearly anyone could do without special resources or 
talents.  The business, as a whole, has what economists call “low barriers 
to entry.”  The effect of low barriers to entry within the business of 
narcotics at the bottom levels means quite simply that sweeping up low-
wage labor will not make much difference.  That, unfortunately, has 
been at the forefront of our anti-drug efforts:  sweeping up low-wage 
labor in the person of mules, street dealers, and mid-level managers.  
This effort has been sustained by the cynical manipulation of 
meaningless numbers as described above—by claiming that the 
possessor of five grams of methamphetamine is a “serious” trafficker, 
that the Guidelines really express some rational ranking of harm, and 
that weight is a true proxy for culpability. 
A better method to raise the price of drugs (if that is what we want), 
one rooted in business practices rather than a moral crusade, would be to 
focus on the cash flow returning to bulk producers of narcotics.  In other 
words, ignore the people and take the money.  Unlike the people we 
imprison, that cash flow is not so easily replaced because drug dealers 
do not have ready access to legitimate credit.87  At the very least, this 
plan would offer a less destructive focus for our obsession with rankings 
and numerical evaluation. 
                                                 
85 STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS:  A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 89–116 (2005). 
86 Id. at 103. 
87 See Mark Osler, Osler:  Cutting off Cash Flow the Way to End Drug Trafficking, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/21/cutting-off-
cash-flow-the-way-to-end-drug-traffick/ (discussing the above mentioned approach at 
greater length); see also Mark Osler, What Would It Look Like if We Cared About Narcotics 
Trafficking?  An Argument to Attack Narcotics Capital Rather than Labor, 15 UDC/DCSL L. 
REV. 113 (2011) (proposing a solution to the current drug sentencing problem); Mark Osler, 
Narcotics:  Attack Capital, Not People, HUFFINGTONPOST (May 10, 2011, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-osler/narcotics-attack-capital-not-people_b_86011 
2.html (describing the theory being discussed in this Article in greater detail). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
We can’t, and shouldn’t, completely avoid the use of numerical 
matrices and rankings in our lives.  However, we can be careful about 
how such numerical systems are used, and we have done a lousy job of 
this in the realm of criminal law.  Rather than carefully creating 
something like the Sentencing Guidelines or mandatory minimums 
based on a well-thought-out ordering system that is rooted in reality, we 
have created them thoughtlessly and without principle.  This allows the 
rankings contained in guidelines and mandatory minimums to direct 
action and justify outcomes, despite the fact that they are rooted in 
nothing. 
The cost of this mistake is profound and extends beyond the brutal 
cost of over-sentencing.  The price of fake rankings also includes the loss 
of any comprehensive moral basis for this important social function.  
Without principles and reality informing these most directive and 
dramatic societal actions, the law is nothing but a bully. 
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